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                                                                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   
 
No. 20-1761 
   
 
SAT PAUL VERMA, 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
                         
       
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A090-577-689) 
Immigration Judge: Kelley Fowler 
       
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




AMBRO, Circuit Judge, 
Sat Verma, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States without proper 
inspection in 1982 and became a legal permanent resident in 1990.  In 2013, he pled 
guilty to access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5) due to his role in 
conducting and facilitating sham transactions using fraudulent credit cards and merchant 
accounts at his jewelry store.  The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey convicted and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment and three years of 
supervised release.  The Government charged Verma as removable for this conviction, 
which it argues is an aggravated felony that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to 
the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (“(M)(i)”), 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  One immigration judge (“IJ”) agreed Verma indeed committed an 
aggravated felony, and another denied his application for adjustment of status and 
waivers of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion.  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(the “BIA”) dismissed Verma’s appeal.   
In his petition for review to us, Verma argues he did not commit an aggravated 
felony because the Government failed to prove losses to victims exceeding $10,000.  He 
also challenges the discretionary denial of his application for adjustment of status.   
I. 
We exercise plenary review over the BIA’s determination that Verma committed 
an aggravated felony under (M)(i).  See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 
2012).  In determining whether an offense meets the statutory loss requirement under that 




in which [the noncitizen] committed the crime on a specific occasion.”  Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34, 36 (2009).  We are permitted to consider the presentence 
investigation report and any “sentencing-related material” so long as the noncitizen has 
been given “a fair opportunity to challenge the Government’s claim.”  Fan Wang v. Att’y 
Gen., 898 F.3d 341, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
Verma does not dispute his offense involves the requisite “fraud or deceit” under 
(M)(i), though he argues that a charge under it cannot be supported when the victims are 
not identified.  But this misstates the law.  As we recently explained in Rad v. Attorney 
General, 983 F.3d 651, 669 (3d Cir. 2020), the Government “can establish the loss 
element without specifically identifying a victim or victims; all the statutory text requires 
is that victims exist, and that they have collectively lost over $10,000.”  Here the 
Government clearly identified financial institutions as the victims of Verma’s fraud and 
declined to identify them individually only because the number was so large as to make 
restitution impractical.   
Verma next argues that the BIA improperly treated the “gain” he received from 
the fraud as a “loss” under (M)(i).  We see no evidence the BIA improperly conflated 
gain and loss.  Verma’s November 2017 pre-sentencing report (“PSR”) repeatedly stated 
that he was responsible for a “loss” amount of $270,000.  See, e.g., AR 652 (“Verma is 
responsible for losses totaling $270,000”).  Verma was offered the opportunity to 
challenge the characterization of this amount as a loss, but never did so.  In fact, Verma’s 




Verma and the Government agreed on this loss amount following plea negotiations, for 
the Government initially charged Verma with an offense that caused losses of more than 
$1 million.  
Even if Verma is correct that the BIA could have better explained the 
characterization of the $270,000 as a loss, we have no reason to doubt it reflects actual 
loss “particularly tethered to the convicted counts.”  Rad, 983 F.3d at 667 (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). While (M)(i) does not allow the agency “to treat 
gains and losses as interchangeable,” we have recognized that “[i]n many cases, a 
defendant’s earnings will provide powerful circumstantial evidence of victim loss.”  Id. at 
668.  The amount of Verma’s fraudulent transactions relates directly to the financial 
institutions’ injury, such that the Government easily satisfies the $10,000 loss 
requirement in (M)(i).    
II. 
Verma requested waivers of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h) and (i), 
noting his lengthy residency and employment history, as well as the hardship his removal 
would pose to his U.S. citizen wife and four children.  The IJ determined Verma did not 
merit the waivers as a matter of discretion.  While acknowledging the hardships Verma’s 
removal would pose, the IJ emphasized Verma’s history of crime in the United States, 
including his active role in the credit card fraud.  Further, Verma lied about the number of 
times he had been married and arrested in his 2011 naturalization application.1  The BIA 
 
1 Verma argues he later withdrew his guilty plea for the 1983 conviction, which was 




affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Verma did not merit the waivers despite acknowledging 
the “significant equities.”  AR 5.  He now challenges that decision in his petition for 
review.  
We generally lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of immigration 
relief, including the BIA’s determination that an applicant does not merit a waiver of 
inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).  Our hands are further tied because Verma 
committed an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  He relies on Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067–68 (2020), arguing that the BIA’s failure to 
balance positive equities against negative ones improperly applies a legal standard, thus 
permitting judicial review.  Verma’s Op. Br. 26.  We reject this argument as an attempt to 
“dress up factual findings and discretionary decisions” as legal issues, for a 
“disagreement about weighing hardship factors is a discretionary judgment call, not a 
legal question.”  Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 247, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(internal citation omitted).   
*    *    *    *    * 
 While we appreciate that Verma’s removal may have harsh consequences for his 
family, he committed an aggravated felony while in the United States and we lack 
jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of discretionary relief.  We thus deny his 
 
we could consider this evidence, which was not presented to the BIA, it does not erase 
that Verma lied about his criminal history in his naturalization application.  See Berishaj 
v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts reviewing the determination of 
an administrative agency must approve or reject the agency’s action purely on the basis 




petition for review on the first issue and dismiss the petition with respect to the second 
issue.  
